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Introduction: ‘Nice-Plus’ as the most likely 
scenario if ratification fails 
The pressure is on for the defenders of the 
European Constitution.
1 Although initially it 
seemed as if referenda would only be problematic 
in countries that have a reputation for a certain 
degree of Euroscepticism, now even France and 
the Netherlands look like unsafe candidates for 
public approval. While there is still a fair chance 
that a majority of the French will vote ‘yes’ when 
actually at the ballot box, there is an 
understandable nervousness among pro-
integrationists. A French ‘no’ would be the most 
serious obstacle that any one member state 
among those holding a referendum could create. 
In the likely case that other member states 
besides France then reject the text – possibly for 
entirely different or even opposing reasons – it 
would become extremely difficult to ‘save’ the 
Constitution in its entirety.   
During the last several weeks, there has been 
much talk about a ‘plan B’, which some 
governments or even EU officials are said to 
have already prepared in case ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty fails. But while alternative 
scenarios are likely to be discussed behind the 
scenes, it surely is an exaggeration that anyone 
already has ‘the’ plan B, which only needs to be 
pulled out ready-made from a secret drawer.  
After a possible French rejection, ratification in 
other countries would likely continue at the very 
least until the European Council meeting in June 
2005. Political leaders will use this period to ‘de-
dramatise’ the situation in the public debate and it 
would then depend on the summit as to which road 
is taken. 
The position of the French government would of 
course be of central importance for political impetus 
 
1 The Constitution is formally called the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, but for reasons of 
style and simplicity, the two expressions ‘Constitution’ and 
‘Constitutional Treaty’ are used interchangeably in this 
paper. 
but legally no member state could be forced to stop 
ratification, because unanimous agreement by the heads of 
state would be needed to stop the process altogether.  
If leaders should, however, decide that a continuation of the 
process does not make sense and the Constitution as it 
stands has to be considered ‘dead’, alternative scenarios 
would not provide an easy way out. 
A substantive renegotiation of the Constitution has to be 
considered as unrealistic. Anyone who has followed the 
complex process of consensus-building in the Convention 
and the two intergovernmental conferences knows that the 
present text constitutes a finely-balanced compromise, 
where one change would necessitate many subsequent 
others. Furthermore, a French ‘no’ would stem from very 
diverse reasons, which may not even allow a clear 
conclusion to be drawn in order to negotiate changes. And 
if the Dutch should also vote ‘no’, it could be motivated by 
yet entirely different reasons. 
A second scenario, whereby a second referendum, possibly 
with a protocol to the present Constitution stating (for 
example) that the Council would take into account to a high 
degree the social dimension of any law that it decides upon 
appears to be equally unrealistic. Such a statement, tailor-
made to appeal to the French public, would diminish the 
chances for approval in other countries. This would notably 
be the case in the UK, were ratification will be extremely 
problematic and where many already perceive the 
Constitution in its present form as a ‘Franco-German stitch-
up’ that will impose red-tape on the British economy. 
Besides this dilemma, it is of course also highly 
questionable as to whether the French would actually 
change their minds owing to such an addendum. 
The most likely scenario is thus unfortunately the one of a 
‘Treaty-of-Nice-Plus’. Accordingly, the existing rules 
established by the Treaty of Nice will of course continue to 
apply, and the heads of state would then try to save from 
the Constitution whatever they can agree among themselves 
in order to get these elements ratified through the respective 
national procedures.  
The first victims of such an approach are of course the 
added value of the Constitution in terms of legal coherence 
and the strong political statement for an EU that renews its 
determination to be more than just an economic union. The 
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Constitution is more than the sum of its parts and the 
political and legal advantages of this ‘extra’ would be 
irretrievably lost if political leaders settle for this solution.  
Nevertheless, even a ‘plan B’ based on such a ‘pick-and-
choose’ approach would face important legal and political 
hurdles. This paper gives a brief overview of important 
elements in the Constitution and their prospects of being 
saved from a ‘dead’ constitutional text. These elements are 
ranked by their desirability for a well-functioning EU-25, 
while their likelihood of adoption is assessed according to 
the possible legal and political obstacles.  
Legal and political hurdles 
Concerning the legal obstacles, three main categories can 
be distinguished: 
1. Elements that do not require a Treaty change. 
Ratification according to the respective national 
procedures would not be needed for elements that fall 
under this category. A unanimous agreement between 
the heads of state and government would be sufficient 
combined with a legal act from the Council of Ministers. 
If EU institutions other than just the Council are affected 
by this change, this legal act would have to be followed 
by an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) between the 
EU’s three main institutions, the Council, Parliament and 
the Commission. An IIA cannot alter or complement the 
stipulations of primary law and would only be 
permissible if it does not change the existing power 
balance of the EU.
2 Yet the exact effects of an IIA are 
often unclear and thus there is a risk that jurisprudence 
could ultimately have the last word as to whether it is a 
viable way of saving certain elements of the 
Constitution. 
2. Elements requiring a Treaty change. In this case 
ratification is always needed. The conditions for 
ratification depend on the respective national provisions 
of each member state. 
3. Elements requiring a Treaty change that shift 
competences or control from the national/regional level 
to the EU. Again ratification is needed for elements in 
this category, but in many countries strict conditions 
must additionally be taken into account (which, for 
example, require laws to amend the national constitution, 
qualified majorities in the national parliament or a 
referendum, or the association of other parliamentary 
bodies such as second chambers). As the assessment is 
done by the respective national bodies, the same element 
can be classified differently in different member states. 
Table 1 shows the legal conditions for ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty in the different member states as they 
stand at present (the most problematic member states from 
a legal viewpoint are highlighted in bold). 
The table serves as an indicator of the legal obstacles that  
                                                      
2 See A. Maurer et al., Interinstitutional Agreements in CFSP: 
Parliamentarisation through the Backdoor?, Working Paper No. 
5, EIF, Vienna, 2004. 
may arise in the ratification of key elements if a plan B 
were to include any shift of power to the EU level. The 
main advantage is that in a number of currently problematic 
countries political leaders would not necessarily have to 
renew their commitment to hold a referendum, including 
France and the UK. Whereas they would not be legally 
obliged, there would certainly be considerable political 
pressure for them to do so. 
And even if this is left aside, that does not mean that 
ratification would become an easy task: Denmark and 
Ireland would still have to ask their populations for 
approval; in the Czech Republic and Poland, qualified 
majorities in parliament would be needed, which currently 
look unlikely to be obtained. In the latter two countries, a 
referendum could offer a solution for ratification, but 
depending on the content, a plan B may not be very 
appealing to the population (e.g. the double-majority voting 
system may be even less acceptable to the Polish if other 
more attractive elements of the Constitution were to be 
scrapped). There could also be problems in a number of 
other countries where a higher parliamentary majority is 
needed than the government actually controls. And finally 
there are powerful national courts (especially the German 
constitutional court) that would continue to be very critical 
of any power shift to the EU level ‘by the back door’. So 
contrary to what some commentators have stated lately, 
major innovations from the Constitutional Treaty could 
face serious obstacles – whether these are a part of the 
Constitution or an alternative plan B. A closer look at a 
number of important elements, their legal requirements and 
political obstacles therefore seems justified. 
Elements that concern the efficiency of the EU 
1. The double majority voting system (Art. I-25) 
Regarding efficiency, the current rules of the Treaty of 
Nice can only be considered as an ‘emergency programme’ 
for the enlarged Union. While it is true that moroseness and 
a lack of political leadership from national representatives 
are the prime factors for possible political deadlock, there 
are also rules and structures that invite such behaviour.  
Therefore, for many who are concerned with the everyday 
business of the EU, the new system for the weighting of 
Council votes under qualified majority (QMV) appears to 
be the most important element to keep the enlarged Union 
capable of acting. Although member states often do not 
actually vote in the Council, a credible possibility of being 
outvoted fundamentally changes the character of 
negotiations. The current system of the Treaty of Nice does 
not provide for such a credible scenario, because it is far 
too easy to organise a blocking minority in the enlarged 
Union.
3 The current rules will continue to apply until 
November 2009 in any case, and they threaten to paralyse 
the new EU during this important period – which in turn is 
likely to influence public opinion on the enlarged Union. 
                                                      
3 See R. Baldwin and M. Widgrén, Council Voting in the 
Constitutional Treaty – Devil in the Details, Policy Brief No. 53, 
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Table 1. Legal conditions for ratifying the Constitution 
AT  Simple majority in both houses of parliament sufficient for ratification (likely to be obtained, lower house approved on 11 May 
2005)  
BE  •  Simple majority sufficient for ratification (likely to be obtained, senate already approved on 28 April 2005) 
•  Seven parliamentary bodies have to ratify it (at the federal, regional and community levels) 
CY  Simple majority sufficient for parliamentary ratification (likely to be obtained) 
CZ  •  Ratification would need a 3/5 majority in both houses (unlikely to be obtained) 
•  A (non-obligatory) binding referendum is an alternative, but would require a constitutional act, as there is not yet a 
general framework regulating a nationwide referendum (no obligatory referendum for a plan B)  
DE  •  Parliamentary ratification needs a 2/3 majority in both houses (likely to be obtained, lower house approved on 12 May 2005)  
•  Powerful constitutional court with a tradition of critically scrutinising European integration  
DK  In the absence of a 5/6 majority in Parliament, the Danish Constitution requires a binding referendum (27 September 
2005) 
ES  •  Simple majority sufficient for parliamentary ratification 
•  A constitutional court has ruled that all elements of the EU Constitution are in line with the Spanish Constitution (December 
2004) 
•  Successful consultative referendum (February 2005) & ratification (May 2005) (no referendum needed for a plan B) 
EE  Simple majority sufficient for parliamentary ratification 
EL  •  A 3/5 majority is needed because a constitutional amendment is necessary; 
•  Constitutional Treaty ratified through parliament (19 April 2005) 
FI  Parliamentary ratification needs a 2/3 majority, because an amendment to the national Constitution is necessary (likely to be 
obtained) 
FR  •  Conseil Constitutionnel: a law was needed to change the French Constitution in order to ratify the EU Constitution 
•  Law approved by both chambers (convened as a Congrès) by a 3/5 majority (1 March 2005) 
•  Referendum on 29 May (but no obligatory referendum for a plan B!) 
HU  •  Parliamentary ratification needed a 2/3 majority;  
•  Ratification on 20 December 2004 
IE  •  Obligatory, binding referendum for any transfer of power 
•  Government to publish a Constitutional Amendment Bill, which must be approved by parliament and then put to the 
people for referendum 
IT  Parliamentary ratification by both houses needed a simple majority (Congress on 25 January, Senate on 6 April 2005) 
LV  Simple majority sufficient for ratification (likely to be obtained) 
LT  •  Simple majority sufficient for ratification  
•  Parliamentary ratification on 11 November 2004 
LU  •  Parliamentary ratification needs a 2/3 majority (likely to be obtained) 
•  Consultative referendum on 20 July 2005 (but no obligatory referendum for a plan B!) 
MT  Parliamentary ratification needs a simple majority (likely to be obtained) 
NL  •  Parliamentary ratification probably needs a 2/3 majority (likely to be obtained) 
•  Consultative referendum on 1 June 2005 (no obligatory referendum for a plan B!) 
PL  •  Parliamentary ratification would need a 2/3 majority in both houses (unlikely to be obtained) 
•  (Non-obligatory) referendum, but 50% turnout needed in order to be valid (but no obligatory referendum for a plan 
B!) 
PT  •  Parliamentary ratification would only require a simple majority (likely to be obtained)  
•  Referendum foreseen for October 2005 (but no obligatory referendum for a plan B!) 
SK  Ratification on 11 May 2005, which needed a 3/5 majority 
SL  Ratification needed a simple majority (1 February 2005) 
SE  •  Parliamentary ratification will probably require a 75% majority (likely to be obtained) 
•  1/3 of parliamentarians would be needed to call a consultative referendum 
UK  •  Parliamentary ratification (through amendment of the European Communities Act of 1972) would require a simple majority 
(likely to be obtained)  
•  Referendum foreseen for spring 2006 (but no obligatory referendum for a plan B!) 4 |SEBASTIAN KURPAS 
•  Legal requirements: High. Ratification of this element 
is needed, because the text of the current treaties (Art. 
205 TEC and Art. 3 of the Protocol to the TEC and TEU 
on the Enlargement of the European Union) would have 
to be changed. Since this issue also affects the relative 
power of each member state at the EU level, national 
sovereignty is concerned, which would further increase 
the conditions for national ratification. 
•  Political obstacles: High. The change of the voting 
system was one of the most contested elements during 
the negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference 
and the main reason agreement could not be reached in 
December 2003. In fact, two countries – Poland and 
Spain – will lose significant veto power under the 
double-majority voting system. Agreement was only 
reached when the government of former Prime Minister 
Jose Maria Aznar lost the Spanish national elections and 
was replaced by the current socialist government under 
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, which was more inclined 
to reach a compromise. The Polish then found 
themselves isolated on this issue and agreed to the new 
system. In the meantime, although the Spanish public 
approved the Constitution on 20 February 2005, it could 
well be that the government is not ready to accept the 
unfavourable element if it is singled out of the 
Constitution’s ‘package deal’. This sensitive issue may 
also be linked to the negotiations about the EU’s budget 
if no agreement on the financial perspective is reached 
beforehand, because the Spanish will be very anxious to 
safeguard regional funds. The even bigger obstacle, 
however, is more likely to be the Polish government, 
which had a very difficult time in accepting the deal. By 
the time this issue re-emerges on the European agenda, 
it looks as if the Polish government might have changed 
(elections are to be held in October 2005), and the Civic 
Platform, whose parliamentary leader Jan Rokita uttered 
the famous words: “Nice or Death”, may be in power. 
Again budgetary negotiations on regional policy could 
open up a way forward, which would most probably 
entail countries such as Germany, the UK and France 
having to agree to an overall boost of the EU’s budget. 
That, however, is far from likely.  
2. Qualified majority voting as a rule (Art. I-23.3) 
The Constitution stipulates that the Council takes decisions 
by majority voting except when it explicitly mentions 
otherwise, whereas so far unanimity has been the rule. In 
concrete terms, this means that 24 existing policy areas 
have been shifted from veto to majority voting (e.g. large 
parts of justice and home affairs [JHA] and cultural policy). 
It also means that 21 newly introduced (elements of) policy 
areas fall directly under majority voting (e.g. the entire 
energy, civil protection and humanitarian aid policies, 
tourism and sports policies as well as the establishment of 
permanent, structured cooperation in the area of defence). 
The more significant aspect is that a rule has been 
established that changes the logic for future integration. 
Every policy under unanimity voting will have to be 
explicitly mentioned and will be classified as exceptional. 
•  Legal requirements: High. Ratification is required and 
as this Treaty change directly concerns national 
sovereignty, many member states face particularly 
stringent conditions for ratification. Ireland and 
Denmark would have to hold obligatory referenda. A 
possible alternative to the establishment of QMV as a 
rule would be to simply bring some (or all) of the 45 
policy areas foreseen by the Constitution under QMV 
on an ad hoc basis. From a legal point of view the areas 
concerning JHA would be particularly attractive, 
because Ireland and Denmark continue to opt out of 
important elements of this policy under the Constitution 
(see protocols 18 and 19 for Ireland and protocol 20 for 
Denmark) and therefore these two countries would not 
have to hold referenda.  
•  Political obstacles: High. The fact that a general rule is 
being established will make it difficult for those 
member states with a high degree of scepticism to agree 
to this element in an isolated manner. Thus the approach 
of limiting the shift to QMV on some or all of the policy 
areas that would be affected under the Constitution on 
an ad hoc basis also seems advisable with regard to the 
political obstacles. The areas to which it applies would 
have to be those where a large degree of consensus 
exists. From a political perspective, some aspects of the 
JHA policies could be candidates for such a shift. 
3. A permanent European Council president (Art. I-22) 
The creation of such a permanent post would have two big 
advantages in terms of efficiency: it would provide the 
European Union with a ‘face’ who could give coherence to 
the Union representation at an external level and it would 
hold the potential for greater internal coherence when it 
comes to setting priorities. 
•  Legal requirements: Intermediate. Since the European 
Council is not an EU ‘institution’ in the legal sense, the 
current treaties only refer to the presidency of the 
European Council in Art. 4 TEU: “The European 
Council shall meet at least twice a year, under the 
chairmanship of the Head of State or Government of the 
Member State which holds the Presidency of the 
Council”. Nevertheless, Art. 203.2 TEC states that this 
Council Presidency is to “be held in turn by each 
Member State (…) for a term of six months” (emphasis 
added). A Treaty change with subsequent ratification 
would thus be required in order to put in place a full-
time president as foreseen by Art. I-22 of the 
Constitutional Treaty. It is possible, however, to avoid 
the especially strict conditions for ratification if national 
sovereignty is not affected. This would require that the 
new post were not given any new competences and 
would be explicitly limited to a clear procedural role. 
Yet that is likely to meet strong political opposition 
from its advocates. 
•  Political obstacles: High.  The question about a 
permanent president was one of the most divisive in the 
Convention. It was an issue that for a long time divided 
most of the smaller countries from the larger ones. THE PROBLEMS WITH A ‘PLAN B’| 5 
Those leaders from larger countries who tended to take 
a more intergovernmental stance pushed for a 
strengthened Council (especially Prime Ministers Jose 
Maria Aznar and Tony Blair and President Jacques 
Chirac, which thus led to the term ‘ABC-plan’), against 
the opposition of smaller countries such as Austria or 
Finland, which had instead wanted to strengthen 
supranational elements like the Commission or the 
European Parliament. After Germany and France had 
tabled a proposal that combined the (French) idea of a 
permanent Council president with the (German) concept 
of an elected president of the European Commission, 
many smaller countries felt ‘betrayed’ by Germany for 
giving in to France, but ultimately accepted this 
compromise. It is therefore difficult to imagine that a 
permanent president would be accepted without the 
other part of the deal. The combination with the election 
of the president of the European Commission (Art. I-
27.2) may, however, provoke questions about a shift of 
power to the EU level (and therefore face tougher 
conditions for ratification), because it would give more 
democratic legitimacy to a supranational body than is 
specified under the current provision (Art. 214.2 TEC 
only requires ‘approval’ by the European Parliament 
instead of an ‘election’ in Art. I-27.1 of the 
Constitutional Treaty). Another solution of simply 
changing the title from ‘European Council president’ to 
‘chairman’ along with an explicit statement that only 
procedural powers would be given to this post would 
not be acceptable to the advocates of the post who were 
already concerned about the watering down of the 
current text.  
4. Reduction of the number of commissioners 
(Art. I-26.6) 
Already it can be observed how difficult it is for President 
Jose Manual Barroso’s Commission to find a common line 
and then keep to it once it has been agreed. Under the 
current rules, there is one commissioner per member state 
(Art. 213.1 TEC), but an automatic change would take 
place with the next Commission in 2009 if the Union 
consists of at least 27 member states by then (Art.4 of the 
Protocol on the Enlargement of the Union). Rotation would 
be “based on the principle of equality” among member 
states, but the exact number of commissioners would still 
have to be negotiated “by the Council acting unanimously”. 
In contrast, the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty 
already determine a considerable reduction in the number 
of commissioners to two-thirds of the number of member 
states. Yet as important as this reduction is for a better 
internal functioning of the Commission, it would only 
apply to the succeeding Commission (probably) starting in 
2014. 
•  Legal requirements: Low. It has to be stressed that 
commissioners are not the representatives of their 
member state of origin, but for most countries ‘their’ 
commissioner is an important interlocutor and it could 
therefore be argued that the ‘loss’ of a permanent 
commissioner would affect national power. Yet this 
question does not matter anymore, because member 
states have already accepted abandoning the principle of 
one (permanent) commissioner per member state with 
the ratification of the Treaty of Nice. The Constitutional 
Treaty would thus not mean any further shift of national 
power. Legally, it would be easiest to just agree to the 
‘2/3 rule’ of the Constitutional Treaty when the 
unanimous vote in the Council takes place. 
•  Political obstacles: High. Besides the permanent 
president, the number of commissioners was the most 
sensitive issue for many smaller countries. Again, their 
agreement has to be seen as part of a larger ‘package 
deal’. Many smaller countries agreed to the considerable 
reduction only because they saw the supranational 
dimension of the EU strengthened by giving more 
powers to Parliament (e.g. through co-decision as the 
‘normal procedure’) and the Commission (e.g. through 
abolishing the pillar structure). They hoped that this 
would prevent a ‘directorate of the large’ in the Council 
from dominating the enlarged EU. 
5. Foreign minister (Art. I-28) 
The subject of a foreign minister is a hot favourite when it 
comes to a plan B. A ‘merger’ of the two current positions 
of the high representative of the Council and the 
commissioner for External Relations triggered the 
imagination of many who are concerned with a more 
visible and ultimately more powerful European Union on 
the international stage. A more efficient solution will, 
however, depend on what kind of merger will actually 
evolve. In practice the current dual structure has turned out 
to work much better than many had initially predicted, 
partly owing to a wise cooperation of the two personalities 
in charge. A merger that does not imply a Treaty change 
will certainly be a step towards a more coherent EU 
external policy (a policy domain that usually receives the 
highest ratings from citizens when asked in which area they 
would like to see a more active Union), but it would not 
mean any radical improvement in the EU’s capacity to act. 
•  Legal requirements: Low. Ratification of this element is 
not necessarily needed. An IIA could be sufficient, if a 
Treaty change could be avoided and the existing power 
balance between the institutions is preserved. Current 
provisions state that the high representative is the 
secretary-general of the Council and consequently 
firmly assign this post to that institution (Art. 18.3 TEU 
and Art. 26 TEU). By itself that does not prevent the 
person from also becoming vice-president of the 
Commission, but it could create a conflict between the 
missions of the two posts, if distinctions were not made 
clear. While a commissioner is directed to “neither seek 
nor take instructions from any government or from any 
other body” (Art. 213.2 TEC), the high representative’s 
role is to assist the EU presidency (Art. 18.3 TEU) and 
the Council (Art. 26 TEU), even acting on behalf of the 
Council “where appropriate”. Art. I-28.4 of the 
Constitution shows awareness for potential tension and 
distinguishes between the EU’s common foreign and 6 |SEBASTIAN KURPAS 
security policy (CFSP) and its external action. An IIA 
would have to be very clear and detailed on this point so 
that the different competences would not become 
blurred and that ultimately the current power balance 
between the institutions is not altered.  
Further, the commissioner of the same nationality as the 
foreign minister would have to step down in order to be 
in line with the Treaty stipulation that only one 
commissioner per member state should be part of the 
college (Art. 213.1 TEC). The constitutional provision 
that the foreign minister “shall preside over the Foreign 
Affairs Council” (Art.I-28.3), however, contradicts Art. 
203.2 TEC, which determines the rotating presidency of 
member states. Adoption of this aspect would most 
probably necessitate a Treaty change and therefore also 
ratification (just like that for the permanent president of 
the European Council as discussed above), but some 
claim that the respective country could cede this office 
to the foreign minister for the period of its presidency. 
In any case, that would mean that this arrangement 
would have to be negotiated with the country in 
question every six months anew. The title of ‘foreign 
minister’ may even have to be dropped to avoid a Treaty 
change, meaning essentially that one person would take 
on the two existing posts. The term could nonetheless be 
used in the public debate (like the ‘Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’ is also commonly referred to as 
the ‘Constitution’.) 
•  Political obstacles: Intermediate. There is wide 
agreement among the member states that the current 
dual structure should be merged into one. Nevertheless, 
there are still opposing ambitions that one of the 
concerned institutions should profit from the merger – 
the ‘supranational’ Commission or the 
‘intergovernmental’ Council. From a legal perspective, 
an IIA would not allow for any power shift; from a 
political view, a successful solution can only be a 
compromise that strikes a fair balance between the more 
integration-minded countries on the one hand and those 
who would like to strengthen the intergovernmental 
character of the EU’s foreign policy on the other.  
6. External Action Service (Art. III-296.3) 
The External Action Service (EAS) is another element that 
is often mentioned when a plan B is discussed. As with the 
foreign minister, it concerns the form rather than a shift of 
powers. Deliberations within the institutions concerning the 
concrete establishment of the EAS have already started. As 
foreseen in Art. III-296.3, staff would come from the 
national diplomatic services, the Council and the 
Commission.   
•  Legal requirements: Low. Ratification of this element 
would probably not be needed, as an IIA is likely to be 
sufficient to establish the EAS. Already the existing 
provisions stipulate that the “diplomatic and consular 
missions of the Member States and Commission 
delegations (…) shall cooperate” (Art. 20 TEU). The 
EAS as outlined in Art. III-296.3 would formalise this 
cooperation. Further, the fact that this service would 
“assist” the EU foreign minister in the fulfilment of 
his/her mandate is not in contradiction with the existing 
treaties, because this mandate would continue to be 
determined by the Council in all CFSP matters. The 
EAS would also be in the spirit of the current acquis, 
which states that “The Member States shall work 
together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is 
contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations” (Art. 11.2 TEU). If adoption through an IIA is 
chosen, a shift of power to the EU would not be 
possible. This means that plans for a strategic planning 
department within the EAS would have to be in close 
cooperation with the member states. 
•  Political obstacles: Low. There seems to be a consensus 
among the member states that an EAS should be 
established. The question is again about where it would 
be situated and what kind of tasks it would ultimately 
have. There are clearly countries that are more open to a 
more politically ‘independent’ EAS than others (e.g. 
Germany and many of the smaller member states). 
These countries see the EAS as a nucleus for more 
integration in the future. Others, however, regard it as a 
tool for better coordination of member-state policies 
with the actions of the EU at an international level. The 
legal constraints of an IIA will favour the 
intergovernmental view. Concerning the institutional 
affiliation of the EAS, a compromise between the two 
visions seems to be the best solution. Therefore the EAS 
should be located neither in the Council nor in the 
Commission, but become “a structure that reflects the 
double-hatted nature of the Foreign Minister”.
4 
Nevertheless, such a ‘free-standing’ structure may in 
turn cause legal complications, because it would 
probably need a separate legal personality for its 
actions, which the current Treaty provisions could not 
grant. 
Elements that address democracy 
The elements presented so far deliberately concern the 
strengthening of the EU’s efficiency. Of course there are 
equally important elements that would improve democracy:  
•  The first one to note is the enhanced role of the 
European Parliament through the introduction of the 
co-decision procedure as the ‘normal procedure’. 
The European Parliament would generally be on the 
same level as the member states in the Council when it 
comes to legislating. The legal requirements for the 
adoption of co-decision as the normal procedure would 
be high, because it would require a Treaty change with a 
power shift towards the (supranational) Parliament. 
Politically it would likely meet the opposition of the 
more sceptic member states, which reject the idea of the 
                                                      
4 See G. Grevi and F. Cameron, Towards an EU Foreign Service, 
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European Parliament as a ‘second chamber’. They 
prefer to seek a more democratic Union primarily 
through the better association of national parliaments to 
the EU’s decision-making process. These member states 
seem to see the European Parliament as a rival to 
national parliaments rather than as a complementary 
source of democratic legitimacy and may only agree to 
a strengthened Parliament if in return other more 
intergovernmental elements were also adopted (for 
example, that of a permanent EU president). 
•  The citizens’ initiative (Art. I-47.4) would have better 
chances of adoption. Legally it could even be put into 
practice through an IIA, because it affects the working 
of the Commission, but neither implies a power shift to 
the EU level nor does it change the power relations 
between the EU institutions. The scope of the initiative 
would only cover the framework of the Commission’s 
powers, so that no new competences could be claimed 
through the back door of direct democracy. Also, the 
Commission would not lose its monopoly on initiatives, 
because citizens can only ‘invite’ the Commission to 
submit a proposal, but not force it to do so. Politically, it 
would be a very welcome element after a possible 
rejection of the Constitution, because it would 
demonstrate that the EU is making an effort to open up 
to its citizens. Strictly speaking, one has of course to 
admit that even today one million citizens could 
organise a petition to the Commission and some 
political reaction could be expected. 
•  Another likely candidate for ratification could be the 
limited changes in the protocol on the role of national 
parliaments  and the protocol on the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality,  in particular the 
‘early warning system’ (Art. 6). Both protocols were 
annexed to the EC and EU treaties in Amsterdam to 
calm fears of an uncontrolled EU integration. Politically 
and legally there should be no problem with the 
adoption of changes to these protocols, because national 
parliaments will probably ratify provisions that enhance 
their control and bring some improvements to them as 
regards information and transparency. Yet it has to be 
conceded that – as with the citizens’ initiative – if a 
number of national parliaments really did voice 
concerns about a certain legislative initiative going 
against the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission 
would currently be well advised to take such concerns 
seriously. 
•  Finally,  public sessions when the Council acts as a 
legislator (Art. I-24.6) and all other innovations in Art. 
I-24 concerning the configurations of the Council 
could be agreed unanimously by the heads of state and 
government and would send a positive political signal in 
terms of transparency. Some governments, however, 
seemed to be less enthusiastic about the prospect of 
having to vote under the critical eye of the public, 
claiming that it would make it harder to find a 
consensus. They may therefore seize the opportunity to 
drop this ‘uncomfortable’ innovation. 
Conclusion: It may require a plan B to realise 
that the Constitution had actually not been such 
a bad deal after all. 
As can be taken from this short overview, a plan B would 
not be an unproblematic way out, if the Constitution is not 
ratified in the upcoming referenda. From a strictly legal 
perspective, the most important advantage of a plan B is 
that in many currently problematic countries political 
leaders would not be obliged to renew their commitment to 
a referendum. Nevertheless, almost all the major elements 
of the Constitution would require ratification with 
especially strict conditions that would apply in a 
considerable number of member states, such as qualified 
majorities or even referenda (e.g. in Denmark and Ireland).  
From a political perspective, however, political leaders may 
very well have to hold referenda, because they will be hard-
pressed by the media, their political opponents and the 
general public to do so. This policy brief has intended to 
give an insight into the problems linked to the nature of the 
Constitution as a ‘package deal’: what may be acceptable to 
individual member states as an integral part of a larger 
compromise is often likely to be refused if isolated from the 
rest. As realistic survivors of a ‘dead’ Constitutional 
Treaty, it is possible that there would only be the foreign 
minister (a role that may have to be stripped of some of its 
initially foreseen competences and maybe even its title), the 
External Action Service, the citizen’s initiative and a very 
limited number of further improvements, especially 
concerning Council reform. All in all, it would be a rather 
meagre result after so much political capital has been 
invested. It shows that the Constitutional Treaty may not be 
an optimal solution, but the best that can be obtained in the 
foreseeable future. Unfortunately, in the current national 
debates there is a strong tendency to ignore the fact that the 
Constitutional provisions are a compromise between 
different national preferences, where no government 
obtained all of its initial demands. For many who are 
sceptical today, it may require a plan B to realise that the 
Constitution had actually not been such a bad deal after all. 
Regrettably, it will then be too late. 
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